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[So F. No. 19342. In Bank. Mar. 22, 1957.] 
CLAUDINE HERDA, Appellant, V. CLAH,ENCE HERDA, 
Respondent. 
[1] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-E1Iect of Agreement of Parties. 
-Husband and wife made provisions for support and mainte-
nance an mtegral part of their property settlement agree-
ment where they clearly expressed their purpose to settle 
their rights in all respects except as otherwise provided, where 
the wife accepted the provisions for her in full satisfaction 
of her right to the community property and of her right to 
support and maintenance of herself and the minor children, 
and where the husband agreed to pay her a designated sum 
per month for such support and maintenance, and the fact 
that the amount of existing community property was small 
and the amount that might otherwise accrue before termina-
tion of the marriage was speculative did not detract from the 
spouses' clearly expressed intention, as between themselves, to 
fix the amount of subsequent payments. 
[2] ld.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.-
It is not significant that the amount agreed on for support 
and maintenance of the wife and minor children in a property 
settlement agreement was the same that the husband had been 
paying the wife following their separation but before the 
agreement was executed j the parties were entitled to agree 
to an amount that could not be decreased during the minority 
of the children or increased unless the welfare of the children 
so required. 
[3] ld.-Permanent Alimony-Duration of Allowance-Tel'Dlina-
tion.-Where there was no express provision in a property 
[1] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 217; Am.3m .. 
Divorce and Separation. § 586 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Divorce, § 203; [3, 4] Divorce, 
§ 214; [5] Divorce, § 216(5); [6] Divorce, § 180 (4). 
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settlement agreement incorporated in a 1938 divorce decree that 
the payments attributable to the wife's support should termi-
nate on her remarriage and no express provision that they 
should continue until her death, the insignificant amount of the 
eommunity property involved justified the conclusion that by 
necessary implication the payments attributable to the wife's 
support should terminate on her remarriage just as those' at-
tributable to the support of the children terminate on their 
reaching their majority. 
[4] ld.-Permanent Alimony-Duration of Allowance-Termina.-
tion.-The conclusion that payments provided for the support 
and maintenance of the wife in a property settlement agree-
ment incorporated in a divorce decree should terminate on the 
wife's remarriage, based either on an express provision to that 
effect or inferred from the provisions of the agreement as a 
whole, does not conflict with the conclusion that it is an inte-
grated bargain and that the payments are not otherwise sub-
ject to modification; it would be unreasonable to conclude· 
that the payment should continue for the wife's benefit after 
the obligation to support the children had terminated on their 
reaching their majority and the obligation of her support had 
been assumed by her second husband. 
[6] ld.-Permanent Alimony-Modi1ication of Allowance-Rearing 
a.nd Determination of Motion.-An order denying a motion to 
have payments for the support and maintenance of a former 
wife and minor children reduced on the grounds that the wife 
had remarried and that one of the children was about to enter 
the armed services was not res judieata in a subsequent pro-
ceeding to have the payments terminated on the ground that 
the wife had remarried and both children had reaehed their 
majority where, at the time of the previous modification pro-
ceedings, neither child had reached his majorit:1' and it could 
not be determined whether denial of the motion was based 
on a determination that the wife's remarriage was immaterial 
or on continuing need of the full amount for the children's 
support, care and education. 
[6] ld.-Counsel Fees.-Where a property settlement agreement 
incorporated in a divorce decree specifically provided that the 
husband should indemnify the wife for all costs and attorney's 
fees in defending any motion or proceeding affecting the agree-
ment, and did not make her right to such fees dependent on 
her inability to pay them, the trial court erred in Mnying her 
prayer therefor on the ground that she had not shown such 
inability. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San 




230 HERDA tJ. HERDA [48 C.2d 
judgment. Murray Draper, Judge. Order affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
Henry W. Schaldach for Appellant. 
Chas. E. R. Fulcher for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff and defendant were married in 
1925 and separated in 1937. On March 1, 1938, they executed 
a property settlement agreement. It recited that owing to 
disputes and differences between them the parties had agreed 
to live separate and apart and that it was their "mutual wish 
and desire . . . that a full and final adjustment of all their 
property rights, interests and claims be had, settled and deter-
mined by said parties in this Agreement, including custody 
and maintenance of the r two] minor children of said lJarties." 
It provided: . 
"Now THEREFORE, it is agreed in consideration of the 
mutual promises, agreements, and covenants contained herein, 
it is covenanted, agreed, and promised by each party hereto, 
to and with the other party hereto, as follows: 
"FIRST: That, except as hereinafter specified, each party 
hereto is hereby released and absolved from any and all obliga-
tions and liabilities for the future acts and. duties of the 
other, and that each of said parties hereby releases the other 
from any and all liabilities, debts or obligations of any kind 
or character incurred by the other from and after this date, 
and from any and all claims and demands, including all claims 
of either party upon the other for support and maintenance 
as wife or husband or otherwise, it being understood that 
this instrument is intended to settle the rights of the parties 
hereto in all respects, except as hereinafter provided. • • . 
"FIFTH: [Plaintiff] does and shall accept the provisions 
herein made for her in full satisfaction of her right to the 
community property of the respective parties hereto, and in 
full satisfaction of her right to support and maintenance, and 
for the support and maintenance of said minor children as 
herein provided." 
Provisions were then made for the division of the property. 
Plaintiff received household personal property and defendant 
received an automobile. A life insurance policy on defend-
ant's life was assigned to plaintiff and defendant agreed to 
keep the policy in fQrce. It was further agreed that plaintiff 
should have custody of the minor children and be entitled 
to take them out of the state. 
) 
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Paragraph eight provided that "The husband agrees in 
consideration of the premises and mutual covenants and agree-
ments herein contained to pay to the wife the sum of Two 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per month as and for the 
support and maintenance of herself and the minor children 
of said parties, said payments to commence on March 1, 1938 
and to continue monthly thereafter on the first (1st) day of 
each and every month thereafter." It also provided that 
defendant should pay certain debts and plaintiff's moving 
expenses should she decide to leave the state. 
On March 18, 1938, plaintiff filed an action for divorce on 
the grounds of extreme cruelty. She attached a copy of 
the agreement to the complaint and prayed that it be ap-
proved and made a part. of the decree by reference. On 
April 18th she secured an interlocutory decree of divorce, 
which approved the agreement and incorporated it in its 
entirety by reference. It also provided that "IT Is FURTHER 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant be, and he 
hereby is, required to pay to plaintiff herein, as and for her 
support and the support, care and education of the minor 
children of said parties, the sum of Two Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($250.00) per month, which said payments to com-
mence March 1, 1938, and continue monthly· hereafter on 
the 1st day of each and every month." 
A final decree of divorce was entered in 1939, and plaintiff 
remarried in 1943. In 1944 defendant moved to have the 
payments reduced on the grounds that plaintiff had remarried 
and that one of the children was about to enter the armed 
services, but his motion was denied. In 1954 he moved to 
have the payments terminated on the ground that plaintiff 
had remarried and both the children had reached their ma-
jority. Plaintiff moved for attorney's fees to resist defend-
ant's motion, and following a hearing the court ordered that 
the interlocutory and final decrees "be modified by termi-
nating all payments for the support of the plaintiff and for 
the support, care and education of the minor children of the 
parties hereto forthwith." It also ordered that no counsel 
fees be allowed for plaintiff's counsel. Plaintiff appeals. 
She contends that the provision for monthly payments was 
an integral and inseparable part of the property settlement 
agreement of the parties and that therefore the amount of 
the payments attl'ibutable to her cannot be reduced because 
of her remarriage. She also contends that the order denying 
modification in 1944 is res judicata in her favor. Defendant 
) 
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contends, however, that the provision for monthly payments 
was a provision for alimony subject to section 139 of the Civil 
Code and that even if it constitutes an integral and insep-
arable part of the property settlement agreement, his obliga-
tions thereunder terminated after plaintiff remarried and the 
children reached their majority. He also ·contends that the 
1944 order is not res judicata on the ground that it may 
have been based on continuing need of the full amount for the 
support, care, and education of the children, who were then 
still minors. 
In Messenger v. Messenger; 46 Ca1.2d 619, 628 [297 P.2d 
988], we held that when "the parties have clearly expressed 
their 'purpose of fixing and adjusting their personal and 
property rights, ' have provided that the provision for alimony 
is 'for and in consideration of the permanent and lasting 
division and settlement of all their property rights of every 
kind and nature,' and the wife has waived 'all right to future 
maintenance and support . . . I except as herein otherwise 
expressly provided,' the conclusion is inescapable that they 
have made the provisions for support and maintenance an 
integral and inseparable part of their property settlement 
agreement. With such conclusive evidence of integration, the 
provisions for support and maintenance or alimony would be 
subject to modification only if the parties expressly so pro-
vided." (Accord: Anderson Y. Mart, 47 Ca1.2d 274, 279 
[303 P.2d 539].) [1] It is clear from the provisions of the 
agreement quoted above, that the agreement in the present 
case falls squarely within the foregoing rule. The parties 
stated their intention to settle both their property and sup-
port and maintenance rights, and the fact that the amount of 
existing community property was small and the amount that 
might otherwise accrue before the termination of the marriage 
was speculative, in no way detracts from their clearly ex-
pressed intention, as between themselves, to fix and determine 
the amount of the payments thereafter. [~] Similarly, it 
is not significant that the amount agreed upon was the same 
amount defendant had been paying plaintiff following their 
separation but before the agreement was executed. In the 
absence of the agreement, that amount might or might not 
have been accepted by the court as appropriate for alimony 
and child support and it could have been modified in the 
event of changed circumstances. The parties were entitled to 
agree to an amount that could not be decreased during the 
minority of the chjldren or increased unless the welfare of 
, 
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the children so required. (See Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Ca1.2rl 
36,43 [265 P.2d 873) ; Messenger v. Messenger, supra, 46 Cal. 
2d 619, 627-628; Anderson v. Mart, supra, 47 Ca1.2d 274, 
281.) 
[3] The question remains whether the agreement may 
properly be interpreted as providing for payments for plain-
tiff's support following her remarriage. In Anderson v. Mart, 
supra, 47 Ca1.2d 274, 280, we pointed out that in the case 
of integrated agreements executed and incorporated in decrees 
entered before the 1951 amendment to section 139, payments 
pursuant thereto do "not terminate on the death of the 
husband or the remarriage of the wife unless the agreement 
so provided. [Citations.)" (See also Taliaferro v. Talia-
ferro, 125 Cal.App.2d 419, 427 [270 P.2d 1036].) In the 
present case there is no express provision that the payments 
attrihutable to plaintiff's support should terminate on her 
remarriage. There is also, however, no express provision that 
they should continue until her death. Under these circum-
stances we have concluded that the insignificant .amount of 
the community property involved in the agreement justifies 
the conclusion that by necessary implication the payments 
attributable to plaintiff's support should terminate on her 
remarriage just as the payments attributable to the support 
of the children terminate on their reaching their majority. 
In Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Ca1.2d 36, 41-42 [265 ·P.2d 873], 
the court stated that when "the parties have made the pro-
vision for support and maintenance an integral part of their 
property settlement agreement, the monthly payments will 
ordinarily have a dual character. To the extent that they 
are designed to discharge the obligation of support and mainte-
nance they will ordinarily reflect the characteristics of that 
obligation and thus have the indicia of alimony. [Citations.) 
On the other hand, to the extent that they represent a 
division of the community property itself, or constitute an 
inseparable part of the consideration for the property settle-
ment, they are not alimony, and accordingly cannot be modi-
fied without changing the terms of the property settlement 
agreement of the parties." It was therefore held in the Dexter 
case that a provision that the payments should terminate on 
the remarriage of the wife did not indicate that the monthly 
payments provided in an integrated agreement were for ali-
mony. [4] It is thus clear that the conclusion t.!lat the 
payments should so terminate, based either on an express 
provision to that ~ect or inferred from the provisioIUI of 
) 
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the agreement as a wholc, does not conflict with the conclusion 
that it is an integrated bargain and that the payments are 
not otherwise subject to modification. Since the agree-
ment in the present case dealt primarily with support rights 
and the payments were described as for support and mainte-
nance, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the agree-
ment contemplated that the payments should continue for 
plaintiff's benefit after the obligation to support the children 
had terminated (see Anderson v. Mart, supra, 47 Ca1.2d 
274, 283, and cases cited) and the obligation of plaintiff's 
support had been assumed by her second husband. Harnden v. 
Harnden, 102 Ca1.App.2d 209 [227 P.2d 51], Lane v. Bradley, 
124 Ca1.App.2d 661 [268 P.2d 1092], and Taliaferro v. Talia-
ferro, 125 Ca1.App.2d 419 [270 P .2d 1036], are not contrary 
to our conclusion herein since in those cases the agreements 
either expressly provided when the payments'should terminate 
or involved the settlement of substantial property rights. 
(5] At the time of the previous modification proceedings 
neither child had reached his majority and it cannot be de-
termined from the record whether the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion to reduce the payments was based on a 
determination that plaintiff's remarriage was immaterial or 
was based on continuing need of the full amount for the 
support, care, and education of the children. Since the chil-
dren have now reached their majority, the circumstances have 
materially changed since the entry of that order, and plain-
tiff has failed to prove that it was based on a determination 
of the issue now before us. Accordingly, it is not res judicata. 
(Hurd v. Albert, 214 Cal. 15, 26 [3 P.2d 545, 76 A.L.R. 1348] ; 
Horton v. Goodenough, 184 Cal. 451, 460 [194 P. 34] ; Emer-
.on v. Yosemite Gold Min. etc. Co., 149 Cal. 50, 57 [85 P. 122] ; 
Estate of Miller, 104 Cal.App.2d 1, 18 [230 P.2d 667].) 
(6] Paragraph ten of the agreement provides in part that 
defendant agrees to "pay and indemnify the wife for all 
expenses, costs and attorney's fees in defending any suit, 
motion or proceeding brought by the husband or anyone in 
his behalf in any manner affecting this Agreement, and the 
wife's right thereto in any respect whatsoever." Since this 
provision does not make plaintiff's right to attorney's fees de-
pendent on her inability to pay them, the trial court erred 
in denying her prayer therefor on the ground that she had 
not shown such inability. 
The order is rev~rsed insofar as it denies plaintUf's motion 
) 
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for an award of attorney's fees. In all other respects it is 
affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in the 
judgment of affirmance. I do not, however, agree with the 
majority in its reliance on the cases of Dexter v. Dexter, 42 
Ca1.2d 36 [265 P.2d 873], Messenger v. Messenger, 46 Ca1.2d 
619 [297 P.2d 988], and Anderson v. Mart, 47 Ca1.2d 274 
[303 P.2d 539]. I express no approval of the law as set forth 
in the above mentioned cases. In the Dexter and Messenger 
cases the court was concerned chiefly with the character of 
the payments provided for in the property settlement agree-
ment and whether or not such payments constituted such an 
integral part of the agreement as to prevent a subsequent 
modification thereof. 
Anderson v. Mart, supra, has some analogy to the case at 
bar. In that case plaintiff's former husband died. The agree-
ment there contained no provision t.hat the monthly payments 
should cease on plaintiff's remary;i,A\ge, or the attainment of 
majority by the parties' child, or tile death of the payor. In 
the case at bar, the agreement likewise contained no provision 
for termination of the monthly payments by remarriage of the 
payee, majority of the children, or death of the payor. Both 
the Anderson case and the case at bar involved agreements 
entered into prior to the 1951 amendment of section 139 of 
the Civil Code. The section as it read prior to the amend-
ment provided that "Upon the remarriage of the wife, the 
husband shall no longer be obligated to provide for her 
support but such remarriage shall not affect his duty to pro-
vide for the maintenance of the children of his marriage." 
The 1951 amendment provided that "Except as otherwise 
agreed by the parties in writing, the obligation of any party 
in any decree, judgment or order for the support and mainte-
nance of the other party shall terminate upon the death of 
the obligor or npon the remarriage .of·the other party." 
The trial court in the Anderson case held that the payor's 
estate was indebted to plaintiff (his former wife) on the prop-
erty settlement agreement and that the "agreement was in-
corporated in and made a part of the decree in the divorce 
action and that the provision for support therein was an 
inseparable part of an integrated property settlement agree-
ment and therefore entered judgment for plaintiff for $14,190 
) 
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to be paid out of the funds of the estate in due course of 
administration. That sum was fixed by the court as the pres-
ent value of $50 per month for plaintiff's life expectancy." 
(47 Ca1.2d 274, 277, 278 [308 P.2d 539].) A majority of 
this court held that the trial court properly allowed plaintiff 
to recover from her former husband's estate "the amount 
attributable to plaintiff's support for the remainder of her 
life expectancy." The conclusion was reached by reasoning 
that the support payments were not separable from the balance 
of the agreement and that the waiver provisions did not pre-
vent plaintiff from enforcing the agreement as made. A ma-
jority also held that the agreement in the Anderson ease 
fell "squarely within the ... rule" of the Messenger case. 
In the case at bar, where the majority reach an entirely 
different result, it is also held that the agreement "in the 
present case falls squarely within .the . . . rule" of the 
Messenger case. That rule is that when "the parties have 
clearly expressed their 'purpose of fixing and adjusting their 
personal and property rights,' have provided that the pro-
vision for alimony is 'for and in consideration of the perma-
nent and lasting division and settlement of all their prop-
erty rights of every kind and nature,' and the wife has 
waived 'all right to future maintenance and. support . . ., 
except as herein otherwise expressly provided,' the con-
clusion is inescapable that they have made the provisions 
for support and maintenance an integral and inseparable 
part of their property settlement agreement. With such 
conclusive evidence of integration, the provisions for support 
and maintenance or alimony would be subject to modifica-
tion only if the parties expressly so provided." (46 Ca1.2d 
619,628 [297 P.2d 988].) Despite the fact that the agreement 
here contained no provision of any kind for termination of 
the monthly pa~7ments the majority holds that such pay-
ments terminated upon the remarriage of the wife and the 
attainment of majority by the children. It is noted, inter 
alia, in the majority opinion that there was here "no express 
provision that they [the payments] should continue until 
her [plaintiff's] death." There was also no such provision 
in the Anderson case agreement. 
The reasoning of the majority in the present case and 
the result reached by it appear to me to be inconsistent_ In 
the first instance the Messenger rule is relied upon and it 
is also said that $·!1'he parties stated their intention to settle 
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the fact that the amount of existing community property was 
small and the amount that might otherwise accrue before tlle 
termination of the marriage was speculative, in no way 
detracts from their clearly expressed intention, as between 
themselves, to fix and determine the amount of the payments 
thereafter. Similarly, it is not significant that the amount 
agreed upon was the same amount defendant had been 
paying plaintiff following their separation but before the 
agreement was executed. In the absence of the agreement, 
that amount might or might not have been accepted by the 
court as appropriate for alimony and child support and it 
could have been modified in the event of changed circum-
stances. The parties were entitled to agree to an amount 
that could not be decreased during the minority of the chil-
dren or increased unless the welfare of the children so re-
quired. " The majority, having concluded that this was an 
integrated, inseparable property settlement agreement, then 
stated: "The question remains whether'the agreement may 
properly be interpreted as providing for payments for plain-
tiff's support following her remarriage. In Anderson v. Mart, 
supra, 47 Ca1.2d 274, 280, we pointed out that in the case 
of integrated agreements executed and incorporated in de-
crees entered before the 1951 amendment to section 139, 
payments pursuant thereto do 'not terminate on the death 
of the husband or the remarriage of the wife unless the agree-
ment so provided. [Citations.]' (See also Taliaferro v. 
Taliaferro, 125 Cal.App.2d 419, 427 [270 P.2d 1036].) In 
the present case there is no express provision that the pay-
ments attributable to plaintiff's support should terminate on 
her remarriage. There is also, however, no express pro-
vision that they should continue until her death. Under 
these circumstances we have concluded that the insignificant 
amount of the community property involved in the agreement 
justifies the conclusion that by necessary implication the 
payments attributable to plaintiff's support should terminate 
on her remarriage just as the payments attributable to the 
s1lpport of the children term1'naie on their reaching their ma-
jority." (Emphasis added.) On just what reasoning this 
conclusion is based escapes me. If the monthly payments are 
an integrated part of the property settlement agreement 
and the parties ~~eed that the wife would receive $250 per 
'month without express provision for the termination thereof 
on her remarriage, how can it be concluded that her re-
marriage terminated such payments in view of the reliance 
) 
J 
238 HERDA t1. HERDA [48 C.2d 
by the majority on the Anderson case t The code draws 
no distinction between remarriage of the wife and the death 
of the payor. 
The majority next quotes from the case of Dexter v. Dexter, 
42 Ca1.2d 36, 41, 42 [265 P.2d873], to the effect that monthly 
payments in a property settlement agreement "will ordi-
, narily have a dual character. To the extent that they are 
designed to discharge the obligation of support and mainte-
nance they will ordinarily reflect the characteristics of that 
obligation and thus have the indicia of alimony. [Citations.] 
On the other hand, to the extent that they represent a 
division of the community property itself, or constitute an 
inseparable part of the consideration for the property settle-
ment, they are not alimony, and accordingly cannot be modified 
without changi~g the terms of the property settlement agree-
ment of the parties.!' The majority then notes: "It was 
therefore held in the Dexter case that a provision that the 
payments should terminate on the remarriage of the wife did 
not indicate that the monthly payments provided in an 
integrated agreement were for alimony. It is thus clear thtlt 
the conclusion that the payments should so terminate, based 
either on an express provision to that effect or inferred from 
tle provisions of the agreement as a whole, dfJes not conflict 
with the concZusion that if is an integrated bargain and that 
the payments are not otherwise subject to modification." 
(Emphasis added.) Then we come to the illogical summa-
tion that c, Since the agreement in the present case dealt 
primarily with support rights and the payments were de-
scribed as for support and maintenance, it would be unreason-
able to conclude that the agreement contemplated that the 
payments should continue for plaintiff's benefit after the 
obligation to support the children had terminated (see Ander-
Ion v. Mart, supra, 47 Cal.2d 274, 283, and cases cited) and 
the obligation of plaintiff's support had been assumed by her 
second husband" I I'll the Anderson case the provisions were 
also for support and maintenance, and furthermore, a ma-
jority of this ,court has heretofore held that the labels adopted 
by the parties are not conclusive and that it is not controlling 
that the monthly payments for support have some of the 
indicia of alimony (Messenger v. Me88enger, 46 Ca1.2d 619, 
625, 626 [297 P.2d 988], Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Ca1.2d 36 [265 
P.2d 873], and Fox v. Fox, 42 Ca1.2d 49 [265 P.2d 881]). 
Much has been said by a majority of this court in earlier 
eases about th~Jbharacter of the payments in a property 
Mar. 1957] HERDA tI. HERDA 
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settlement agreement being one of fact for the trial court 
in a modification proceeding. However a majority has also 
held proper the action of a trial court refusing the admission 
of evidence on that point (Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Ca1.2d 36 
[265 P.2d 873], and see my concurring and dissenting opinion 
at pages 44, 45). In the Anderson case the trial court de-
termined that the monthly payments were an integrated and 
inseparable part of the property settlement agreement and 
that the obligation for such payments did not terminate 
on the death of the payor since no provision for termination 
had been agreed to by the parties. A majority of this court 
affirmed the judgment in that respect. Here the trial court 
found that the remarriage of the wife and majority of the 
children terminated the obligation for the monthly payments 
even though no provision for termination was to be found in 
the agreement entered into by the parties. A majority of 
this court affirms the action of the trial court but not on the 
theory that there was sufficient evidence to support the con-
clusion of the trial court on an issue of fact. The exact 
theory on which the majority conclusion is based is not 
stated_ It would appear from reading the opinion that the 
opposite conclusion was to be reached since it is held that 
the monthly payments were an integrated, inseparable part 
of the property settlement agreement which contained no 
provision for termination on remarriage of the wife or death 
of the payor. It appears to me that the conclusion is in-
escapable that neither Anderson v. Mart nor Messenger v. 
Messenger is in "accord" with the holding here as the ma-
jority assures us they are, but that they are directly contra 
to both the reasoning and conclusion of the majority here. 
The majority seems to have seceded from its position that 
the character of the payments in a property settlement agree-
mimt is a question of fact for the trier of fact. It is apparent 
from the majority holdings in the recent cases of Dexter v. 
Dexter, 42 Ca1.2d 36 [265 P.2d 873], Fox v. Fox, 42 Ca1.2d 
49 [265 P.2d 881], Flynn v. Flynn, 42 Ca1.2d 55 [265 P.2d 
865], Messenger v. Messenger, 46 Ca1.2d 619 [297 P.2d 988], 
Anderson v. Mart, 47 Ca1.2d 274 [303 P.2d 539], and the 
case at bar that the character of the payments for support 
and maintenance in a property settlement agreement is a 
question for thia court to determine as it sees fit without 
reference to either the determination of the trial court or other 
standard based upon logic or precedent. Until such .;time 
as a majority of ~,eourt sees fit to clarify its position with 
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)"(~pect to the contractual rights of the parties and announces 
It Mtllndard based upon sound precedent, the statement in my 
c()neurring and dissenting opinion in the Flynn case that the 
Ihw in this field constitutes an effective trap designed to catch 
b()th wary and unwary attorneys who are trying honestly and 
Nmllcientiously to protect their clients' interests is more 
applicable now than it was then. The untold confusion 
exillting in the law in this field as the result of the conflicting 
rlllciFlions of this court is also a trap for trial and appellate 
jllr]~es who are honestly endeavoring to do their duty in decid-
ing cases of this character. This court could, by employing 
a lIIimple proces.'> of logic and reason, so clarify the law in these 
C8Aes that lawyers and trial judges would know how to dis-
p'Jlle of them properly and thus relieve this court of at least 
a portion of its already tremendous work load. 
J adhere to the views expressed in my concurring and dis-
Aenting opinions in the Fox, Dexter, Flynn, Messenger and 
Anderson cases, and it is my considered opinion that if and 
when the majority of this court adopts these views the con-
ftlJllion which now exists in this field of law will be obviated 
and the burden now cast upon the courts in disposing of these 
e8llCFl will be greatly reduced. 
There may be cases where, in the settlement of property 
rigMs npon the dissolution of a marriage, that one sponse re-
eeives a larger share of the community property and agrees 
to pay the other cash in lieu thereof. In such a case the 
aw-eement should provide for the amount to be paid and the 
time of payment. It is obvious that such payments should 
not terminate upon the death of the payor or the remarriage 
of the payee. But in cases such as this and Anderson v. 
Mart, supra, where it appears that the payments are for sup-
po)"t and maintenance, and no provision is made for their 
termination, they should, as a matter of law, terminate upon 
t.he death of the payor or the remarriage of the payee. 
The trial court determined here that the provision for 
monthly payments wa'> intended by the parties as support and 
maintenance for the wife and children and that snch pay-
mcnts were intended to terminate upon the remarriage of the 
wife and the attainment of majority by the children. A read-
ing of the record disdoses ample evidence to sustain this 
determination and it should, therefore, be affirmed. 
SCHAUER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concnr in 
the judgment insoUrr as it affirms the order of the trial court. 
The evidence U; this case, as I view it, supports &nd estab-
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lisbes legally tenable ground :for all essential findings and con-
clusions of the trial court arid for that reason I would affirm 
its order in all respects. Also I would prefer that the majority 
had expressly overruled rather than attempted to distinguish 
Messenger v. Messenger (1956),46 Ca1.2d 619 [297 P.2d 988], 
and Anderson v. Mart (1956), 47 Ca1.2d 274 [303 P.2d 539], 
in tbe respects as to wbich each appears to assert and rely on 
a doctrine inconsistent witb the bolding of the majority today. 
Sbenk, J., concurred. 
